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TOWARD SENTENCING REFORM FOR DRUG
COURIERS*
Steven B. Wassermant
INTRODUCTION
A typical Second Circuit drug courier prosecution involves
a foreign defendant, often a woman, 1 working for an
unapprehended supplier who is operating from abroad. The
defendant is arrested at Kennedy airport, pleads guilty and is
sentenced in proportion to the quantity of drugs secreted in her
digestive tract, shoes or luggage. The proper sentence is the
only matter seriously contested in such cases.
Until recently, a principal sentencing issue in drug courier
cases has been whether the defendant was sufficiently aware
of the amount of drugs on her person so as to be held account-
able for it.2 In its decision in United States v. de Velasquez,3
the Second Circuit eliminated this issue, upholding a norm of
strict quantity-based sentencing for all cases of drug posses-
sion.4 In de Velasquez, the court concluded that " a defendant
convicted of importing drugs may be sentenced for the total
quantity of drugs in his possession even if he thought he pos-
sessed a lesser quantity.... [and] even if the total quantity
was not foreseeable."5
While the Court in de Velasquez ruled out downgrading
the base sentence because of a defendant's mistake about
* @1995 Steven B. Wasserman. All Rights Reserved.
t Adjunct Professor of Law, John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Legal Aid
Society, Criminal Defense Division.
1 For an enlightening discussion about women drug couriers in the New York
justice system, see Tracy Huling, Injustice Will Be Done: Women Drug Couriers
and the Rockefeller Drug Laws (Correctional Association, 1992).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1993).
3 28 F.3d 2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 679 (1994).
4 Id. at 6.
6 Id. at 3. See also United States v. Ivonye, 30 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 1994); Unit-
ed States v. Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d 368 (2dl Cir. 1993); United States v. Imariagbe,
999 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1993).
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weight,6 it did not foreclose a downward departure from the
base sentence.7 The court cautioned, however, that a down-
ward departure based on mistake as to weight would be up-
held only in unusual cases where "the gap between belief and
actuality was so great as to make the [Sentencing] Guideline
grossly unfair in operation."' Even this limited avenue of relief
under the Sentencing Guidelines is closed to drug couriers who
are subject to five- and ten-year statutory minimum senten-
ces.' For a defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence,
the only avenue of relief is through fruitful cooperation with
law enforcement."
The inevitability of the straight-weight sentence also
draws attention to an underlying issue of sentencing policy:
the emphasis that drug weight receives as a sentencing factor,
particularly for offenders who have limited awareness and no
ecomomic stake in the weight of the drugs concealed on their
persons. This Article proposes that a courier's accountability
for drug weight, as a matter of rational sentencing policy and
justice, should be in proportion to his involvement as well as
his stake in the particular shipment and in the ongoing enter-
prise. Couriers who are categorized as minor participants, in
both the shipment and the ongoing enterprise, should bear a
correspondingly diminished responsibility for the weight of the
drugs. Moreover, Congress should abolish weight-based mini-
mum sentences for this category of offender.
de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 6.
Id., 28 F.3d at 6; see also Ivonye, 30 F.3d at 276 ("We write briefly in this
case only to emphasize that .. . the [dle Velasquez ruling does not preclude con-
sideration of a downward departure."); Imariagbe, 999 F.2d at 708 ("Perhaps one
might hypothesize an unusual situation in which the gap between belief and actu-
ality was so great as to make the Guidelines grossly unfair in application, merit-
ing at least a downward departure .... ).
' de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 6 (quoting Imariagbe, 999 F.2d at 708); accord
Ivonye, 30 F.3d at 276.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (1988).
The applicability of the 10-year mandatory sentence for possession of more
than one kiligram of heroin was the only issue on appeal in Ekwunoh. The Second
Circuit decided that the district court's refusal to impose the 10-year mandatory
sentence was improper. Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d at 369.
10 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDER-
AL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAI, § 5K1.1 (West 1994) [hereinafter "U.S.S.G."].
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I. THE DE VELASQUEZ CASE
When Ana Marn de Velasquez passed through customs at
Kennedy Airport upon arriving from Colombia, an inspector
found 168 grams of heroin hidden in the soles of her shoes."1
Although she admitted to having knowingly ingested heroin
that turned out to weigh 636 grams, she disclaimed any aware-
ness of the heroin in her shoes." According to Ms. de
Velasquez, her supplier had told her only that her shoes would
identify her to her New York contact." She maintained her
ignorance of the drugs in her shoes before the probation de-
partment and in a letter to the sentencing court. 4
A. The Decision of the District Court
The district court imposed a forty-six month sentence that
was based upon the total amount of heroin recovered from the
defendant's shoes and digestive tract.5 While the sentence
was the most lenient that could have been imposed for that
quantity of heroin, it was nine months longer than the mini-
mum sentence available for the ingested heroin alone." The
district court denied the defendant's motion for a sentence
reduction. The court reasoned that a reduction was foreclosed
by the Second Circuit's recent opinion in United States v.
Imariagbe'7 which held that drug couriers need not know the
full amount of heroin on their persons in order to be sentenced
for that amount.
B. The Decision of the Second Circuit
On appeal, the defendant urged that the weight of the
heroin in her shoes had to be discounted on due process
grounds, not only because she did not know about it, but be-
I de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 3.
"Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
"Id. at 4.
"Id.
17 999 F.2d 706, 707 (2d Cir. 1993).
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cause it was objectively unforeseeable."8 In affirming the dis-
trict court's decision, the Second Circuit reaffirmed Imariagbe,
and went on to hold that quantity-based sentences for drug
possession must be imposed without regard to foreseeability."9
The 'court held that the sentencing limitation based on
"unforeseeability" is only applicable in drug conspiracy cases in
which the defendant is to be held accountable for drugs pos-
sessed by another."
The court of appeals maintained that "there is nothing
startling, or even notable, in the conclusion that a defendant
who knows she is carrying some quantity of illicit drugs should
be sentenced for the full amount on her person."' Indeed,
"straight weight" sentencing for drug couriers is not a remark-
able development, given the clear command of the Sentencing
Guidelines' and the logic of Second Circuit precedent, which
generally holds the knowing drug possessor/distributor ac-
countable at sentencing for unforeseen aggravating circum-
stances.2
If the decision in de Velasquez was unremarkable, howev-
er, it was by no means dictated by the Sentencing Guidelines
or by Second Circuit precedent. Indeed, the Court in de
Velasquez considered and rejected a viable alternative: to limit
the courier's culpability to the weight he could reasonably have
foreseen to have been placed on or in his person by the sup-
10 de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 4.
" Id. at 4.
20 Id. at 6; see United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1993).
21 de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 5.
Reference to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 demonstrates congressional intent to make
drug couriers accountable for all quantities of drugs with which they are directly
involved without regard to the issue of reasonable foreseeability. Concerning the
requisite mens rea for drug quantity, the Sentencing Guideline provides that "a
defendant who transports a suitcase knowing that it contains a controlled sub-
stance . . . is accountable for the controlled substance in the suitcase regardless of
his knowledge or lack of knowledge of the actual type or amount of the controlled
substance." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, illustration (a)(1).
' See, e.g., United States v. Obi, 947 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding man-
datory minimum sentence where defendant unaware of quantity of narcotics in-
volved); United States v. Pineda, 847 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding mandatory
minimum sentence where defendant claimed he was unaware of quantity of narcot-
ics involved); United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding uniform
double penalty for selling drugs near a school); United States v. Pruitt, 763 F.2d
1256 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding uniform double penalty for selling drugs to a mi-
nor), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1084 (1986).
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plier as part of a 'Jointly undertaken criminal activity.V4 This
approach would be reconcilable with the Sentencing Guide-
lines, as well as the Courts opinions in nonpossessory drug
conspiracy cases, both of which limit a nonpossessing drug
conspirator's sentence to the "foreseeable weight" distributed
by coconspirators.'
Ii. REASONABLE APPLICATION OF WEIGHT AS A FACTOR:
UNITED STATES V. EKWUNOH
The "foreseeable weight" approach previously was adopted
for a drug courier by the district court in United States v.
Ekwunoh.2" In its review of the sentence imposed in
Ekwunoh, the Second Circuit reserved judgment on the appli-
cability to drug couriers of foreseeable as opposed to actual
weight, but overturned a sentence based on foreseeable weight
because it found that the actual weight possessed was foresee-
able by this particular courierY
Caroline Ekwunoh was arrested when she went to the
airport at the behest of her boyfriend to receive a shipment of
heroin that had been flown in from Nigeria.' She was in-
structed to pay $2,000 for the shipment.m The drug source, a
confidential informant for the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, accompanied the defendant to her car and handed her an
attache case that contained just over one kilogram of heroin in
its lining." She was arrested immediately upon putting the
' U.S.S.G. § IBI.3(a)(1)(B). Section IBL3(a) states, inter alia, that in the case
of jointly undertaken criminal activity, the base offense level should be determined
on the basis of all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in further-
ance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. § U.S.S.G. 1BL3(a)
' See United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1993); sen alco United
States v. Lanni, 970 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1992) (Sentencing judge must make speci-
fic factflnding with respect to amount of drugs "reasonably fore eeable by each
conspirator. "[t]he scope of conduct for which a defendant can be held accountable
under the sentencing guidelines is significantly narrower than the conduct em-
braced by the law of conspiracy.) (quoting United States v. Perrone, 936 F.2d
1403, 1416 (2d Cir. 1991)).
" 813 F. Supp. 168, 171 (E.D.N.Y.), vacated, 12 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993).
"United States v. Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d 368, 370-71 (2d Cir 1993).
2Id. at 369.
2Id.
"Id.
1995]
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case in her trunk."'
To avoid the ten-year minimum sentence for possessing
one kilogram of heroin, Ekwunoh testified that the $2,000 she
was given could not possibly have purchased that amount of
heroin.32 On the numerous prior occasions when she had
served her boyfriend as a drug courier, she had usually re-
ceived no more than a 250 gram shipment of heroin.' More-
over, her boyfriend had told her that she was to meet a "drug
swallower," rather than someone who would be handing her
drugs. Based on her boyfriend's drug swallowing, the defen-
dant knew that 400 grams approximates the human abdominal
capacity.'
The district court credited the defendant's claim that the
amount of heroin supplied by the government informant ex-
ceeded her reasonable expectations as to the shipment, and
imposed a five-year minimum sentence based upon a foresee-
able weight of 400 grams.' The government appealed this
decision.
On appeal, the Second Circuit recognized that Ekwunoh
was not a suitable case in which to banish the defendant's
beliefs about drug weight from the sentencing process. Given
the brevity of Ekwunoh's possession and the government's role
in determining the weight of the shipment, it would have been
a travesty to disregard the defendant's expectations about the
weight of the drugs that had been handed to her. Therefore,
the court avoided the issue, and "assum [ed], without deciding,
that even in a possession case, the defendant may be sentenced
only for the quantity of drugs he knew or should reasonably
have foreseen that he possessed."'36
The court of appeals, however, overruled the district
court's factual finding that Ekwunoh could not have foreseen a
shipment of one kilogram. In view of the defendant's prior drug
distribution for her boyfriend as well as similar experience
with her brother and previous boyfriends, the court concluded
31 Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. at 171.
Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d at 369.
3Id.
Id. at 370.
Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. at 171.
31 Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d at 370.
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that the actual weight was foreseeable.' The court observed
that Ekwunoh had admittedly transported far more than a
kilogram of heroin in the months immediately preceding her
arrest.' Indeed, had Ekwunoh been a sentencing guidelines
case, the base sentence might have been increased by virtue of
her admitted course of conduct as a drug distributor.' But
the decision to hold Ekwunoh accountable for the entire kilo-
gram of heroin was not arrived at merely by adding up the
weight of recent past shipments. Instead, the court's opinion as
to "foreseeability" was plainly influenced by its view that
Ekwunoh was not a minor participant in the drug operation,
but rather had an important and lucrative role.4" The court
reasoned that "[slurely, a reasonable distributor of heroin in
such quantities could not turn a blind eye to the possibility
that someday she would be handed at one time a one-kilogram
cache of heroin for distribution.'Al
The court of appeals's characterization of Ekwunoh as a
"distributor" contrasts with the district court's view of her as
one "acting under the domination of her boyfriend." But
whether Ekwunoh was a dominated or a co-active participant,
there can be little dispute that she was not a "minimal" or
"minor" participant in the drug trade. 3 The record left no
doubt about the importance of her ongoing participation, her
close working relationship with the source, and her consider-
able economic stake in what was evidently a family business.
Indeed the court of appeals's analysis demonstrates the very
close connection between what a defendant's role in the drug
Id. at 370-71.
Id. at 370.
U.S.S.G. § 01.3(a)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84 (2d
Cir. 1993).
41 In fact, the district court's opinion notes that the defendant posted a $50,000
cash bail, made a substantial downpayment on a new home in Florida, and bought
a $7700 automobile during the pendency of the case. Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. at
171.
4' Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d at 370-71.
Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. at 180.
In other cases, the Second Circuit has held that the criteria for determining
who is a minimal or minor participant under § 3B1.2 are 'the nature of the
defendant's relationship to other participants, the importance of the defendant's
action to the success of the venture, and the defendant's awareness of the nature
and scope of the criminal enterprise." Shonubi, 998 F.2d at 90 (quoting United
States v. Garcia, 920 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
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operation is and what she will be capable of foreseeing about
any given shipment.
If the equitable principle of just deserts were paramount,
Ekwunoh's relationship to the supplier, as well as her role and
stake in the drug enterprise, would all have been salient is-
sues. In this litigation, "foreseeability of weight" is clearly a de-
rivative issue that turns on the actor's degree of participation
and interest. But these salient factors would not have come
into play if Ekwunoh's sentence had been decided under the
"straight weight" rule articulated in de Velasquez. Ekwunoh
would, in all probability, have received the same ten-year sen-
tence had this been her first experience as a courier. On the
other hand,. Ekwunoh's sentence automatically would have
been reduced by half, regardless of her role, had the D.E.A.'s
scale been a few grams out of balance.
Thus, under the straight-weight rule, morally significant
sentencing factors are marginalized, rather than occupying
center stage in the sentencing process. Regardless of how one
views the sentence imposed in Ekwunoh, it is difficult to de-
fend the process by which it would have been determined un-
der straight-weight sentencing. The inescapable ten-year mini-
mum sentence that would have been imposed demonstrates the
moral untenability of a sentencing scheme in which "straight
weight" operates in tandem with mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing.
III. WEIGHT AS A FACTOR FOR EXPERIENCED DEFENDANTS:
UNITED STATES V. IVONYE AND UNITED STATES V.
IMARIAGBE
In contrast to Ekwunoh, Ivonye and Imariagbe involved
freelance drug couriers who were decidedly less well-connected
to the drug source. Each of these defendants testified that he
had been misled about the weight of the shipment for which he
had been specially recruited by his supplier.44 The defendant
in Ivonye had been told by his supplier that 250 grams had
been placed in his shoes, when in fact 336.5 grams were found
" Ivonye, 30 F.3d at 276; Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d at 369; Imariagbe, 999 F.2d at
707.
[Vol. 61: 643
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there.45 The defendant in Imariagbe had been told that the
lining of the suitcase he was given contained only 400 grams of
heroin, rather than the 850 grams actually present."
While the presentence testimony in both Ivonye and
Imariagbe did not necessarily establish regular activity as a
courier, a role in an ongoing enterprise or a stake in the size of
the particular shipment, it surely did evidence some degree of
experience in the drug trade, particularly an understanding
and concern for the legal consequences of drug weight. 7 Un-
der the Second Circuit's analysis in de Velasquez, the bare fact
that these freelance couriers were susceptible to being misled
about weight argues for holding them accountable for excess
drug weight as a consciously assumed business risk." In both
Ivonye and Imariagbe, however, that the defendants had exhib-
ited a specific concern about the weight of the drugs they were
carrying reduces the value of this straight-weight analysis. 9
The courier who initiates a discussion of drug weight with
the supplier does not display the inadvertent or uncompre-
hending state of mind popularly associated with the drug
"mule" or "camel." An individual who is interested in drug
weight is less likely to be duped or misled on the subject and
more likely to be deterred by a weight which he regards as
unacceptably risky. Because of their interest and concern for
drug weight, rather than because of the magnitude of their
mistake, the defendants in Ivonye and Imariagbe arguably are
legitimate candidates for sentencing in proportion to drug
weight.
IV. THE UNFAIR RESULT OF THE WEIGHT FACTOR IN DE
VELASQUEZ
Unlike the defendants in Ekwunoh, Ivonye and Imariagbe,
Ana Marfn de Velasquez embodies the popular conception of
the drug "mule." Like a beast of burden, she was employed to
transport another's goods, ignorant of the heightened risks
(mainly to herself) or heightened benefits (entirely to another)
Ivonye, 30 F.3d at 276.
Imariagbe, 999 F.2d at 707.
Ivonye, 30 F.3d at 276; Imariagbe, 999 F.2d at 707.
de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 6.
Ivonye, 30 F.3d at 276; Imariagbe, 999 F.2d at 707.
1995]
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associated with a larger shipment. When Ms. de Velasquez
was detained at Kennedy airport and confronted with the
167.8 grams of heroin removed from her shoes, she denied any
knowledge of its presence." At the same time, however, she
promptly admitted to the arresting officer that she had ingest-
ed heroin supplied by Colombian compatriots, which was later
determined to weigh 636.3 grams. 1
In upholding a base sentence that was derived from all
drugs in the defendant's possession, the court of appeals in de
Velasquez ruled out a downward departure based on the
defendant's mistake. The court noted that de Velasquez was an
"ordinary mine-run case," not one in which "the gap between
belief and actuality was so great as to make the Sentencing
Guideline grossly unfair in operation."
52
Perhaps the court in de Velasquez would have approved a
downward departure if the larger cache of drugs had been
placed in the defendant's shoes, rather than in her intestines.
If so, the difference in the sentence would scarcely correspond
to any intelligible distinction in culpability. Indeed, the moral
significance of the "gap between belief and actuality" presup-
poses that the offender knows and appreciates the toxic poten-
tial of the drugs she has ingested. It is questionable whether
any drug swallower meaningfully can be said to appreciate the
toxicity for the body politic of the substance she harbors in her
own body.
The heroin in de Velasquez's shoes increased her base
sentence by two offense levels, and the resulting sentence by
nine months or about twenty-five percent. While the additional
drug weight resulted in a substantial, arbitrary increase in
incarceration, the Sentencing Guidelines also afforded her
countervailing lenity under the statutory mitigating factors. 3
Ms. de Velasquez received a four-level reduction for minimal
participation,' a three-level reduction for acceptance of re-
sponsibility,5 and the lowest permissible sentence in an elev-
en-month discretionary range. 6 Each of these offender-related
' de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 3.
I d.
C2 Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
" de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 3 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a)).
Id. at 3-4 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1).
r This sentencing level, level 23, provides for incarceration for a minimum of
[Vol. 61: 643
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mitigating provisions in section three of the Sentencing Guide-
lines offset more incarceration than she suffered because of the
additional heroin in her shoes.
Even with the maximum benefit of the mitigating factors,
however, the fact remains that Ms. de Velasquez, a
paradigmatic drug mule, received a sentence (forty-six months
for 800 grams) that is identical or comparable to that imposed
upon savvy freelance couriers Imariagbe, (forty-six months for
850 grams) and Ivonye (thirty months for 336 grams).
CONCLUSION: DRUG WEIGHT SHOULD NOT BE AN IuPORTANT
SENTENCING FACTOR FOR DEFENDANTS WHO ARE MINOR
PARTICIPANTS IN DRUG TRANSACTIONS
Drug weight should be demoted as a sentencing factor for
drug couriers who are indisputably "minimal participants"
with no prior history of carrying drugs and no economic stake
in the weight of the drugs with which they are arrested. Surely
the vagaries of drug weight should not dictate the sentence of
a first-time courier who agreed to carry an unspecified amount
of drugs for a stranger in exchange for the price of his airline
ticket or some other small flat fee.
Straight-weight sentencing, imposed without regard to the
offender's awareness of drug weight, has been characterized as
"an erosion of our Anglo-American system of criminal jus-
tice."'7 The district court in Ekwunoh urged that disregard of
the offender's state of mind as to drug weight abandons the
principles of proportionality, based on mens rea, in favor of
administrative uniformity and efficiency:
If a narcotics defendant's culpability must turn on the rigid opera-
tion of mathematical schemes based upon the objective weight of the
drugs, that defendant is at least entitled to hold the government to
some burden of proof (or to permit the defendant to assume some
burden of proof) regarding the defendant's state of mind with re-
spect to that quantity. Otherwise our system of individualized jus-
tice based upon blameworthiness is placed at risk by the gradual
46 months and a maximum of 57 months. Sce U.S.S.G., Sentencing Table, Ch. 5
Pt.A.
' Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp 168, 178 (ED.N.Y. 1993); cee generally, Alun
Griffiths, Comment, People v. Ryan: A Trap for the Unwary, 61 BROO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1995).
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encroachment of a mechanical regulatory system that neither knows
nor cares about the critical mental states of those individuals who
come before the courts. 8
In a stinging rebuke to the application of federal drug
enforcement policy, the district court in Ekwunoh implied that
no United States Attorney would seek to impose an irre-
buttable straight-weight sentence upon a valued member of
our society, such as a law school graduate traveling abroad
who had been misled about the quantity of drugs placed in her
luggage by a classmate.59 Rather, this brand of hyperefficient
case processing is reserved for persons of lower social and
economic status."
To avoid imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence
based on weight, the drug couriers in de Velasquez, Ekwunoh,
Ivonye and Imariagbe testified at their pre-sentence hearings
either that they had been lied to by their supplier about the
quantity of drugs placed on their person or that the particular
shipment for which they were arrested exceeded what they
could have foreseen from past shipments from the same
source.6 A "dishonest-supplier" defense was advanced in de
Velasquez, Ivonye and Imariagbe. Ekwunoh involved an unex-
pectedly large shipment and, incidentally, an unexpected
source: an informant for the D.E.A.
In upholding a doctrine of strict accountability for unfore-
seen extra weight, the Second Circuit has treated the dishon-
esty of the supplier or the unexpectedly large shipment as a
risk assumed by anyone who knowingly distributes drugs. As
the court noted in de Velasquez: "[in a possession case, how-
ever, we see no reason why a defendant who knowingly traffics
in drugs should not bear the risk that his conduct may be more
harmful to society than he intends or foresees. We therefore
decline to fashion a rule that would permit a defendant to
avoid the consequences of that risk because of a fortuitous lack
of knowledge or foreseeability-fortuities which apparently
occur with some frequency."' This last remark intimates that
Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. at 177.
69 Id. at 178.
60 Id.
" de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 3; Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d at 369; Ivonye, 30 F.2d at
276; Imariagbe, 999 F.2d at 707.
de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 6 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 61: 643
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the "mistake-of-weight" defense is an inducement to peijury, in
that it is both easy to raise and difficult to refute.
Rather than focusing on the simple amount of drugs car-
ried, and the defendant's knowledge of that amount, the sen-
tencing of every drug courier should begin with a searching
inquiry into whether or not the courier is a minimal or minor
participant in the drug trade. It is settled Second Circuit law
that minimal participation in a drug operation cannot be in-
ferred from the bare fact that the defendant is a courier, is
not an entrepreneur,6 or has limited finances.' On the oth-
er hand, an inquiry into the significance of drug weight would
be meaningless if the amount of drugs recovered from the
defendant automatically ruled out a finding of minimal partici-
pation. To determine "minimal participation," the sentencing
court should be charged with assessing culpability in the con-
text of all the circumstances. In addition to evidence of knowl-
edge and experience in the drug trade, this would include the
offender's pattern of foreign travel, cash flow and overall life-
style. Due process requires nothing less when the result of the
determination is a matter of five or ten years of incarceration.
If the courier is determined to be a minimal participant,
drug weight should be a secondary sentencing factor. A plausi-
ble benchmark for drug weight as a sentencing factor would be
to consider it in the same way that the value of stolen property
factors into the sentencing of robbers, burglars and extortion-
ists.66 There surely is no justification in either deterrence or
just-deserts theories to treat drug couriers more harshly than
robbers and burglars. In fact, robbers and burglars, unlike
drug couriers, are ordinarily cognizant of the value of what
they are stealing and reap the full benefit of it. Moreover, in-
creased penalties for stealing or extorting more money would
have a more certain deterrent value.
The amount of property stolen, extorted or blackmailed
raises the sentence by one offense level if it exceeds $10,000,
and by seven offense levels if it exceeds $5 million.' The
amount of property burgled raises the offense by one level if it
United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
"Id.
sId.
See US.S.G. §§ 202.1(b)2), 2B3.1(b)(6).
', U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 (b)(6).
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exceeds $2,500, and by eight levels if it exceeds $5 million. '
The weightiest offense characteristics in robbery relate to the
manner of commission: whether a firearm was discharged
(seven offense levels) and the degree of bodily injury (two to six
levels).69
By contrast, the base sentences for drug possession and
distribution range from offense level six to offense level forty-
two, depending only upon the nature and quantity of the drugs
possessed, and without any regard whatsoever to differentiat-
ing offender characteristics."0 These come into play only at
the secondary stage of downward and upward adjustment.7
Straight-weight sentencing is predicated upon single-mind-
ed fidelity to congressional intent to deter drug distribution."2
While the de Velasquez court acknowledged that "[h]arsh pen-
alties may result for the courier [from straight-weight sentenc-
ing, it declined to] construct a rule of law to mitigate the per-
ceived harshness of Congress's sentencing regime."' That, the
court observed, would be a case of the tail wagging the dog."4
In declining to reform the substantive sentencing law, the
Court might also have noted that the limited downward adjust-
ments for "minimal or minor participation" reflect a congressio-
nal intent to assign a circumscribed value to individual miti-
gating considerations in drug courier cases." Perhaps the
most important and salutary practical effect of the de
Velasquez opinion and its progeny will be to make the
anomalies between drug sentencing and the sentencing for
other comparably serious offenses more difficult to ignore.
U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(b)(2).
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)-(3).
70 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a).
71 U.S.S.G. § 3El.1.
7' de Velasquez, 28 F.3d at 5 ("Congress, for purposes of deterrence, intended
that narcotics violators run the risk of sentencing enhancements concerning other
circumstances surrounding the crime") (citing United States v. Obi, 947 F.2d 1031,
1032 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiars)).
73 Id. at 6.
"' Id. See also United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp 485, 523
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("we confront many situations in which the sentencing tail increas-
ingly can be seen to be wagging the guilt-innocence dog").
" See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (mitigating rule).
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